Overall, in the short term, the CDD program increased the stock of higher quality local public goods, but did not lead to fundamental changes in local institutions or decision-making. The technocratic selection intervention improved local project management relative to the traditional status quo and the long-term institutional reform through the CDD intervention.
Short-run impacts of CDD: In data collected in 2009, shortly after the intense first phase of project activity concluded, research found evidence for substantial positive effects of the GoBifo program on the stock and quality of local public goods, but no evidence of impacts on measures of institutional change and collective action In the short-run, GoBifo villages had a larger stock of higher quality local public goods, such as a functioning primary school or community grain-drying floor, than comparison areas which did not receive the GoBifo intervention. There was also more market activity in treatment communities, including the presence of more traders and items for sale, suggesting short-run economic gains. However, the program did not lead to fundamental changes in local institutions or decision-making in the shorter term. Despite the fact that many women in treatment villages attended GoBifo meetings, they were no more likely to voice an opinion in community meetings after the project ended or to play a leadership role in other areas.
Technocratic selection: The technocratic selection intervention improved local project management relative to the traditional status quo and long-term institutional reform through the CDD intervention. Villages that received the nudge to delegate management to technocratically selected individuals outperformed status quo villages by 0.35 standard deviation units, in terms of proposal quality. Technocratic selection villages benefitted further from subsidized management training, leading to a large combined effect of 0.50 standard deviation units on proposal quality.
Long-run impacts of CDD: Exposure to several years of the CDD program, on the other hand, did not lead to improvements in proposal quality. Researchers found that the CDD intervention didn’t change how communities were actually governed. For example, chiefs in CDD communities did not take additional measures to identify high-skilled individuals. The individuals nominated to be the local technocrat through deliberation in community meetings were no different, on average, in CDD groups and the comparison group, in terms of test performance and other characteristics, like gender and age. When it came to actual delegation of project management, chiefs in CDD communities were slightly more likely than the comparison group to delegate project management to high skill individuals. However, the same effect was greater in the technocratic treatment group. These findings indicate that technocratic selection may be a more viable and affordable strategy to attract high human capital individuals to local development projects than attempts to affect institutional transformation in Sierra Leone.
Prior beliefs of experts: Based on the data collected on the priors of policy experts and researchers in Sierra Leone and OECD countries, researchers found that policy experts in Sierra Leone greatly overestimated the potential for long-run institutional change, while OECD policymakers were roughly on target on average. Meanwhile, economics and political science faculty were more pessimistic on average, with a substantial number predicting precisely zero long-run effects.
Thus, the results from this study indicate that there is substantial scope to attract individuals with high skills and human capital into local development projects to achieve positive public outcomes.